The article deals with the concept of the state of exception in judicial reasoning. Two cases from the European Court of Human Rights together with some case law of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court are examined. The author presents three examples of a possible state of exception from particular case law: i) state of emergency, ii) the concept of transitional democracy and iii) economic crisis. The primary goal of the article is to try to define the boundaries of judicial competence in dealing with the phenomenon of state of exception, which traditionally falls within the competence of executive power. The article argues that the attitude towards this problem in case law has changed a lot during the past couple of decades. Although the court usually does not question the need of Government's announcement of particular state of exception (e.g. state of emergency or economic crisis), the judiciary has attributed to itself rather large discretion to examine whether a particular "exceptional" measure is proportional. According to the examined case law, so-called "primary" human rights (e.g. one's right to life, dignity etc.) as opposed to "secondary" rights (eligibility or economic rights) are usually treated as "absolute" rights and may not be infringed upon even during a state of exception. The Ždanoka judgment is here presented, because the vulnerability of the Latvian political system was treated as a certain exception, justifying some deviation from the common standard of safeguard of one's eligibility rights.
INTRODUCTION
After World War II the importance of judicial power greatly increased in European democracies. The creation of European courts and national constitutional courts increased this importance even more. These courts helped a great deal in changing the European (Continental) traditional attitude towards judges as purely obedient servants of legislative and executive power. Former positivistic attitude towards judicial power "contributed" very much in raising authoritarian regimes in twentieth-century Europe. Therefore, the creation of an independent and competent judicial corpus was one of the main transition requirements for reestablished Central-Eastern European democracies at the end of the century.
A state of exception is surely one of the most interesting phenomena that overlaps with political science, sociology and law. "State of exception" in this paper primarily means a certain force majeure, when the execution of ordinary laws and human rights standards might be suspended by executive or legislative decision.
Everyone knows the sentence that "there are no rules without exceptions". This is precisely what concerns the law, which is related with different kind of rules. During the last years legal and political science has mostly focused on the executive and legislature in dealing with the matter of state of exception, for they are the most important players in this field. Nevertheless, I will try to deal with the role that judicial power plays in determining the boundaries of the/a state of exception.
Major national constitutions in contemporary democratic states regulate certain cases of state of exception: martial law and state of emergency are well known examples. For instance, the Lithuanian Constitution (Art. 144) gives the Parliament and the President discretion to proclaim a state of emergency. The application of various human rights is to be suspended, when martial law is in force or during the time of the state of emergency according to the Art. 145-C. Thus the main issue of this paper is to discuss the margins of judicial competence in the case of state of exception in particular legal systems. Among the examples of state of exception I would like to choose not only state of emergency, but also a concept of transitional democracy and even economic crisis.
STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE CASE OF IRELAND V. UK (ECTHR,

1978)
The first example which I would like to examine in this paper concerns the state of emergency in the UK during the crises of terrorism in the 1970s. From 1971 to 1975 the British government in Northern Ireland exercised a so-called "(temporary) extrajudicial deprivation of liberty" in order to prevent and fight the most violent terrorism campaign. These "extrajudicial powers" included the possibility of arrest without a warrant, preventive detention up to 28 days (without a right to appeal), collective internment and so called "five interrogation techniques", including wall standing, hooding, subject to noise, deprivation of sleep, food and drink. whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome this emergency. Moreover, the Court was of the opinion that by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, ... or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State" (ibid.). 5 Ibid.
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Here we see that one's electoral right to stand as a candidate for parliamentary elections is considered by the Court not as an "absolute" right (in comparison with one's right against inhuman treatment and punishment) and its application might be rather flexible depending on the particular political system. Therefore, eligibility rights are considered by the European Court to be "secondary rights" and are not protected on the same level as "primary rights", defined in Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention. In other words, the vulnerability of a particular political system might cause a certain exception from common protection practice of European eligibility rights. In this case we see that a "state of exception" in judicial reasoning might mean not only the particularity of the current situation (e.g. a current state of emergency), but also a certain historical experience in the country's past. This does not mean only flexibility of legal rules, but it might also mean that these rules should be interpreted in light of the general principles of justice and reasonableness. And application of these principles in practise recognises some exceptions from the common meaning of one's electoral rights. should only be "provisional". Relying on the principle of legitimate expectations, in this judgment the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that such a reduction unfairly discriminated against "working pensioners", to whom a particular public pension was already granted and which had already begun to be paid out, and therefore according to the Court this reduction was anti-constitutional. The outcome of this judgment was that the government not only decided to restore the reduced pensions, but also promised "to compensate" the difference which would appear in the future due to this reduction. The reasoning of this judgment received criticism, namely, that the Court in this judgment disregarded the principle of social solidarity on which the entire public social security system is to be based and that the principle of legitimate expectations (concerning the size of elderly pensions) was unfairly treated as an absolute principle. 7 The ratio of this judgment "between the 9 Article 52 of the Lithuanian Constitution mentions only two types of pensions: elderly and disability pensions. Nevertheless according to ordinary legislation in Lithuania besides the said system of ordinary social security pensions (which from public social security fund is to be granted to practically every Lithuanian citizen reaching the particular age) there exist also different types of so called "the state pensions" (valstybinė pensija), which from state budget are paid only to certain extent of people, supposed to have particular merits for the society: former famous statesmen, former public officers (e.g. policemen, judges etc.), famous artists, sportsmen and also some groups of people, which have been victims of the soviet regime, II WW etc. The state pension might be granted and paid irrespectively to the fact, whether a person gets the social security pension or not, therefore it is possible that the same person may be granted a social security (e.g. elderly or disability) pension together with the state pension.
ECONOMIC CRISIS AS A STATE OF EXCEPTION IN
whether the economic crisis should be officially affirmed and each year reaffirmed by particular decree of the government. 11 The Constitutional Court in this decision "between the lines" agreed with the government that this time Lithuania faces a real economic and financial crisis and that the Government may reduce its social security guaranties that were earlier promised to the people. The Court also repeated its earlier statement that this reduction should be provisional, i.e. only for the period of one year. According to the Court, the government and the Parliament, planning and adopting the state budget of each successive year, should examine whether the country's economic situation has improved and whether it is already possible to raise the previously reduced public salaries and social payments.
The Court recalled that this reduction of salaries and pensions should be proportional, i.e. the proportions of size of previous salaries and pensions should be kept and this reduction should not be below the dignity and vital needs of the human being. The Court here also repeated its controversial statement that even during an economic crisis social security pension should not be reduced proportionally more for "working pensioners" than for those who do not have incomes other than public pension. It was already said that the Lithuanian Constitution (Art. 52) mentions only two types of social security pensions: elderly and disability pensions. Therefore the Court stated that during the economic crisis the entire social security system might be changed, but only those pensions not mentioned in the Constitution (e.g. the state pensions) may be abolished.
According to the Court, those pensions that are not provided in the Constitution may be reduced proportionally more than elderly or disability pensions. In the same 10 Therefore, the Constitutional Court here agreed that the social security system in principle could be restructured, by, for instance, abolishing state pensions (for they are not specified in the Constitution); but, the Court requires a "just compensation" (sic!) for such a change. It is unclear just what the phrase "a just compensation" of reduced (or even abolished) pensions means. This terminology comes from the Court's idea that social security payments should be treated as one's right to property (ownership) and that legitimate interests of the particular receiver of any social security aid should be treated as an absolute principle, disregarding the fact that the size of the pension or other social payments might be fixed by the government unfairly or arbitrarily, relying just on populist promises before the elections. If we are of the opinion that this compensation should mean that after an economic crisis the government should compensate the exact difference of reduced pensions, which lasted throughout the time of the crisis, it would mean that the future government would never create an appropriate social security system, for that burden would be too heavy for the working part of the society. Therefore, this idea of "just compensation" should be interpreted not in the context of one's property rights, but in the context of social solidarity, on which the entire social security system is to be based in a democratic society. In other words, the idea of just compensation should be interpreted not only in the context of 
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